Haider Hoballah

This is the transcript of the lecture delivered by Dr Haidar Hoballah at the Salam Centre in London on Friday, 2 May 2025.

Introduction

The issue of marja'iyyah (religious authority) and taqlid (emulation) has occupied a distinguished place in the life of the Shi'a community for a very long time. This makes it both necessary and useful to analyse the concept of taqlid and its actual role within Shi'a life, which is what I intend to do here. Additionally, I will propose an alternative outlook for the relationship between the marja' (religious authority) and the mukallaf (legally obligated follower) for consideration.

Thus, I will divide my discussion into two main sections:

1.   The traditional understanding of taqlid and its manifestations in Shi'a life.

2.   The alternative thought of taqlid and the potential impact it could have on Shi'a societies.

The Traditional Understanding of Taqlid and its Manifestations in Shi'a Life

How does the system of taqlid function in the life of a Shi'a Muslim? What are its mechanisms? And what is its historical background, briefly?

At the outset, many people imagine that the concept of taqlid—along with its three conditions, namely the requirements that the marja' be male, the most knowledgeable (a'lam), and alive—is unique to Imāmi jurisprudence, with no equivalent in other Islamic schools of law. Others believe that the idea of taqlid, along with these conditions, emerged during the Safavid era and did not exist prior to that. A third group even assumes that these ideas only appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially with the publication of al-‘Urwah al-Wuthqah by the Sayyid Kazim al-Yazdi.

All these perceptions are, to varying degrees, inaccurate, though each contains a measure of truth. The concept of taqlid and the conditions pertaining to the marja' were topics discussed by Islamic scholars roughly a thousand years ago. When we review the historical development of these ideas, we find that scholars addressed them initially in the context of the judiciary. They spoke of the requirement for a judge to be the most knowledgeable (a'lam) and about the binding nature of a judge’s rulings.

The reason for raising such issues likely lies in the fact that the Hanafis held prominent judicial positions during the Abbasid Caliphate from the second half of the second Islamic century (8th century CE). The judicial field naturally highlighted such concerns, especially when inconsistencies were observed in the rulings of different judges. In a single city, there might even be multiple judges issuing divergent verdicts. To prevent chaos, scholars sought to regulate the judicial process, setting conditions for judgeship and the judiciary as a whole, guided by the general teachings of the Qur'ān and Sunnah.

Gradually, this line of thinking expanded to encompass the relationship between the mufti (jurisconsult) and the mustafti (seeker of religious rulings). From the second Islamic century onward, Muslims began to show a greater interest in religious matters than they had in the first century. They increasingly sought guidance on every aspect of religious life. Consequently, scholars of jurisprudence were confronted with a new and stronger phenomenon: an overwhelming number of religious inquiries. People and students of religious sciences began turning to leading scholars with their questions, giving rise to what became known as collections of questions and answers (al-Jawābāt). An example is the book Jawabāt al-Masa'il al-Mawsiliyyah, which compiled questions from Mosul, covering issues of jurisprudence and beyond.

This relationship between the questioner and the respondent developed over time into a more organised form, eventually becoming a phenomenon known as istifta' (seeking a legal opinion). Scholars began to consider setting ethical and religious guidelines governing the relationship between the mufti (jurisconsult) and the mustafti (the one seeking a fatwa), and vice versa. This gave rise to the discussion around the qualifications required of a mufti. Over time, among both Shi'a and Sunni scholars, debates evolved concerning the conditions a mufti must fulfil, the ethics of issuing and seeking fatwas, and related matters. Independent works were even authored on these subjects, particularly among Sunni scholars.

As these discussions became more serious and complex, the science of Uṣūl al-Fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) began to pay special attention to questions surrounding the authority of a fatwa, the conditions for issuing fatwas, and so forth. Among the Shi'a, topics such as ijtihad (independent reasoning), taqlid, issuing fatwas, and the conditions of the mufti began to appear in works on Uṣūl al-Fiqh—not in books of jurisprudence itself, it is important to note. Thus, the conditions for a mufti were explored in two places: independently in specialised books, and within dedicated chapters of Uṣūl al-Fiqh studies. This approach was maintained by both Shi'a and Sunni scholars.

During the Safavid period, a major intellectual conflict erupted within Shi'ism concerning jurisprudence and religious law, namely the Uṣūli-Akhbarī dispute over the concept of taqlid itself. While the Uṣūlis defended the practice of following a jurist (faqih), many Akhbarīs rejected it outright, arguing that taqlid was forbidden. According to the Akhbarīs, each legally obligated individual (mukallaf) should personally read the narrations of the Ahl al-Bāyt and act upon their own understanding. They asserted that Muslims should emulate only the Ahl al-Bāyt and no one else.

As a result, Akhbarī scholars did not author works of istidlālī (deductive) jurisprudence; rather, they were content to explain narrations and clarify certain details during commentary. Notable figures such as Allamah al-Majlisī and al-Ḥurr al-’Amālī followed this approach. The notable exception was Shaykh Yusuf al-Baḥrānī (d. 1186 AH), who authored Al-Hada'iq al-Naḍirah, which is considered virtually the first deductive Akhbarī work. For this reason, some regarded him as a "moderate" Akhbarī, while others argued that by employing the method of ijtihad and deductive reasoning, he had veered closer to the Usuli methodology.

As a result of the Uṣūli-Akhbarī conflict over taqlid, the topic became a major and wide-ranging subject. Numerous books and extensive discussions were written on it, and the study of the detailed conditions required for a marja' greatly expanded compared to earlier times.

However, starting from the era of Sayyid Kazim al-Yazdi at the beginning of the twentieth century, the discussions around ijtihad and taqlid shifted focus from ethics and Uṣūl al-Fiqh to be incorporated more systematically within the preliminary sections of jurisprudential works. Consequently, we observe that books of jurisprudence and practical legal manuals (risalah 'amaliyyah) no longer began with the subject of ritual purity (taharah), as had been the tradition, but instead commenced with discussions on ijtihad and taqlid, followed by taharah.

From this, we can conclude:

●       (a) It is not accurate to claim that the concept of taqlid and the conditions for a marja' are exclusively Shi'a Imāmi innovations.

●       (b) It is incorrect to say that the discussions on taqlid and the conditions of marja'iyyah emerged during the Safavid era; rather, what occurred during that period was an enormous expansion in the study of the subject due to the intense debates surrounding it.

●       (c) It is also not correct to assert that taqlid or conditions like the requirement for the marja' to be the most knowledgeable (a'lam) only appeared in the twentieth century with Sayyid al-Yazdi. What truly happened was a greater expansion of taqlid-related discussions within the field of jurisprudence itself, moving these discussions from Uṣūl al-Fiqh into the actual body of jurisprudence and practical legal manuals.

However, the critical question remains: were the concept of taqlid and the conditions for marja'iyyah in the past identical to what they are today?

The answer is certainly NO. The discussions surrounding taqlid and ijtihad evolved and expanded, particularly concerning the conditions for marja'iyyah. Historically, attention focused primarily on the requirements of ijtihad, being the most knowledgeable (a'lam), being alive, and occasionally on male gender (the condition of maleness first appearing in Shi'a jurisprudence around the 10th century AH). However, today, the conditions for marja'iyyah have multiplied, sometimes reaching ten or more requirements.

With the rise of so-called "Political Islam", additional conditions have been introduced, such as the necessity for the marja' to be capable of managing public affairs, to possess courage, political acumen, and similar attributes.

Through historical review, we discover that Islamic jurisprudence gradually added more conditions for the marja‘ or mufti in response to new circumstances in society, in much the same way that computer literacy has become an additional requirement for employees today. For instance, the requirement that the marja‘ be competent in public affairs emerged to make the institution of marja‘iyyah align with the new currents of Islamic political thought—and perhaps also to undermine the authority of maraji‘ who did not subscribe to Political Islam.

Similarly, the condition of a‘lamiyyah (being the most knowledgeable) may have been, at least in part, motivated by a desire to regulate the practice of taqlid and to limit the random selection of maraji‘ by the people, which would otherwise disperse communal energy. Some researchers have drawn parallels here, noting that the Catholic Church’s centralised structure gave it greater strength compared to the decentralisation found among Protestants.

This historical trajectory has led to what we today call the "official, traditional, and classical view" of taqlid. But what exactly is this view?

The current concept of taqlid rests on the existence of a number of jurists within the seminary (hawza ‘ilmiyyah) who vary in their levels of knowledge and depth of research. The dominant theory holds that Shi‘a, both individually and collectively, must refer to a jurist who possesses specific characteristics, chief among them being: life(being alive), a‘lamiyyah, maleness, Twelver Shi‘ism, and similar traits.

If we focus sociologically on the conditions of life and a‘lamiyyah, we find that they foster a form of centralisation within the Shi‘a community. Although this centralisation may not be absolute—since people may disagree on who is the most knowledgeable—it nonetheless creates a significant degree of unity. Consequently, two or three maraji‘ typically garner around 90% of the followers worldwide. This has major implications for financial centralisation, organisational management, and the overall governance of Shi‘a affairs globally.

The simple question is: how does the process of people returning to a specific marja‘ actually occur, thereby forming the institution of the supreme marja‘iyyah among the Shi‘a?

In theory—and setting aside discussions of the existence of political or financial lobbies or networks of influence, which are outside the scope of this discussion—the journey begins within the religious establishment, where a form of intellectual, cultural, and guiding authority exists. This authority directs people toward a particular marja‘ and is composed of what are known as the ahl al-khibrah (the experts). This secondary tier of jurists plays a central role in rallying the Shi‘a around a single figure. The greater the harmony among members and groups within this secondary tier, the fewer the number of maraji‘ who occupy the seat of supreme authority; the reverse is also true.

In practice, the average layperson listens to the ahl al-khibrah and follows their judgement on who is the most knowledgeable. The layperson then adheres exclusively to the most knowledgeable marja‘, with all religious practice tied to that marja‘’s fatwas. Critically, the layperson has no right to question the theory of following the most knowledgeable marja‘; it is simply presumed.

Thus, we discover that the ordinary Shi‘a believer has no real role in choosing fatwas or selecting the marja‘. They are stripped of all forms of authority; real authority lies with the ahl al-khibrah, who channel the community towards the supreme authority—the marja‘.

This framework often results in the layperson losing the ability to critically assess fatwas and becoming deprived of any independent choice. Furthermore, if someone questions the fatwa of the most knowledgeable marja‘ in favour of another jurist’s opinion, they may face intense social criticism. In some Shi‘a communities, merely presenting the opinions and fatwas of a different marja‘ is frowned upon. Many are uncomfortable with the idea of teaching people that multiple opinions exist in modern times; instead, they prefer to present a single, unified version of Shi‘a religious practice, fully aligned with the fatwas of one specific marja‘—often maintaining this loyalty for thirty or forty years—to avoid any social fractures that might threaten Shi‘a cohesion.

For this reason, I personally describe the practice of taqlid in certain Shi‘a social contexts as a form of "allegiance" (bay‘ah). It is more than mere adherence to a jurist’s rulings; it resembles a formal pledge of loyalty. Departing from this allegiance is seen almost as abandoning the community itself, breaching the pledge that binds the individual to the marja‘'s office in both minor and major affairs—even beyond the sphere of religious rulings.

Thus, we discover that the core issue here is the juristic qualification (fiqh) and supreme knowledge (a‘lamiyyah) of the marja‘. These qualities are what grant him absolute authority—beginning with the authority to issue fatwas, passing through judicial authority, and extending to managing the Shi‘a community’s financial, endowment, and organisational affairs, as well as its general political matters, among others.

This is a very brief description of the traditional view of taqlid and its implications, as permitted by the limited time we have here.

An Alternative Understanding of Taqlid and Its Potential Impact on Shi‘a Communities

The second understanding—which I personally believe in—emerges from different starting points in its approach to the issue of taqlid. I can briefly present several key elements:

First Element: Taqlid is not an Absolute Allegiance

The first point is that taqlid is not an act of total allegiance (bay‘ah). It is merely the act of an unlearned individual referring to a scholar to obtain religious rulings. Allegiance (bay‘ah), by contrast, involves absolute submission and obedience to the marja‘ even beyond the realm of fatwas. If a marja‘ adopts a particular political stance, this does not obligate me to follow it, because his political position is a personal opinion, not a fatwa. Even the jurists themselves have explained the difference between taqlid and obedience to the marja‘ in non-juristic matters. Of course, if someone believes in the doctrine of Wilayah al-Faqīh (the Guardianship of the Jurist), that is a separate discussion. Here, however, we are speaking about juristic marja‘iyyah, not guardianship.

Second Element: Taqlid and A‘lamiyyah are Matters Based on Individual Conviction

This means that no one can compel the religious follower (mukallaf) to engage in taqlid of a particular marja‘ unless he is convinced by the very idea of taqlid. If someone is unconvinced by the concept of taqlid and adopts a different perspective, he cannot be deemed a sinner (fasiq) or penalised for it. Moreover, the very idea of taqlid is not subject to taqlid itself; it must be adopted independently. The same applies to the concept of a‘lamiyyah. If the individual is not convinced of the necessity of following the most knowledgeable jurist, then we cannot consider him sinful if he follows someone else.

Third Element: The Fundamental Conditions for the Marja‘ are Juristic Competence and Integrity, not Gender, A‘lamiyyah, or Other Criteria

According to this view, what is essential for the marja‘ are two qualities: genuine juristic competence (fiqh) and moral integrity—honesty in scholarly research and in transmitting fatwas. Conditions such as a‘lamiyyah, maleness, and being alive are not fundamental requirements according to this perspective, as there is no strong and convincing evidence for them. This leads to the possibility of diversity in taqlid among the Shi‘a, thereby ending the phenomenon of centralisation in favour of decentralisation. Consequently, it becomes permissible for the follower to engage in what is known as “diversification in fatwas” (tab‘īḍ).

Fourth Element: Distinguishing Between Juristic Marja‘iyyah and Organisational Leadership

This means that the marja‘ to whom one refers for religious rulings need not be the same person who manages the community’s endowments, finances, social activities, political affairs, and other matters.

Thus, the term “Supreme Marja‘” (al-marja‘ al-a‘la) becomes a purely organisational title that can be assumed by any qualified jurist who presents a practical plan for managing the affairs of the Shi‘a community in the coming years.

Since this is an organisational, rather than purely religious, role, it can be subjected to an electoral process and set within a defined term. Candidates could compete based on the quality of their programmes for advancing the Shi‘a community worldwide over the next five or ten years. Accordingly, a‘lamiyyah in jurisprudence and legal theory would no longer be the exclusive qualification for authority over the Shi‘a world. Instead, in addition to fiqh, other qualifications such as expertise in administration, organisation, finance, political engagement, and so forth would be considered.

For example, what is the candidate’s vision for how Shi‘a minorities should engage with their governments? What is his programme for improving the conditions of Shi‘a minorities globally? What plans does he have for enhancing the economic circumstances of Shi‘a communities? And so on.

Fifth Element: Selecting Fatwas Based on Preponderance

Here lies a very critical point: In the traditional reading, selecting the marja‘ was based on the testimony of the ahl al-khibrah. However, in this alternative reading—after confirming a jurist’s competence—the selection is based on the degree of confidence the follower (mukallaf) has in the soundness and Islamic spirit of the marja‘’s fatwas, even if the follower is not a jurist himself. For instance, if he finds that Shaykh al-Muntaẓarī’s fatwa—seeing khums as a general tax intended to meet the needs of Muslims—resonates more with the spirit of Islam than Sayyid al-Khū’ī’s view, which treats khums as a personal right for the Holy Prophet and the Banū Hāshim, then he should follow al-Muntaẓarī’s fatwa. Similarly, if the follower finds no particular preference among fatwas—especially in minor detailed rulings—he may choose freely between them.

In this manner, the personal outlook and religious-social culture of the mukallaf (religious follower) come to play a role in his choice of the fatwa he deems most suitable and appropriate. He does not invent fatwas himself—since he is not a jurist—but he possesses the authority to choose among fatwas based on his religious-cultural convictions and experience. Thus, the popular trend inclined towards religious reform tends to follow reformist figures, whereas others gravitate towards more traditional personalities. In this way, those followers who hold open-minded and reformist views are no longer trapped under the authority of a marja‘ whose general religious overview and ideas they do not believe in. This leads to a greater degree of harmony between the mukallaf and the fatwas he follows.

Conclusion

The first perspective concentrates authority entirely, depriving the followers of any real capacity or right to choose either their marja‘ or the fatwas they follow. In contrast, the second position distributes authority among three parties: individual followers on the one hand, the juristic religious authority on the other, and finally, the administrative and organisational leadership. This is a perspective being proposed for discussion. As for the juristic arguments that might validate either the first or the second approach, they require a much broader discussion that the current time does not permit.