Haidar Hobballah

This lecture was delivered at the (SICM) in London on 21-6-2024

I will briefly discuss the most famous fundamental theories that explain Imam Hussein's movement. But before that, an important introduction is necessary. The study of Hussein's actions in the last months of his life, from a historical, analytical and philosophical perspective, was almost unknown to the Shia before the mid-20th century. When we review the books written about Hussein before this period, we find that the overwhelming majority simply present the historical narrative in a sorrowful manner. The titles of dozens of books confirm to us that the tragic dimension dominated all writings from the early Hijri centuries until the mid-20th century. This explains why the incident of Karbala did not truly enter the realm of jurisprudential research (the jurisprudence of revolution against ruling authority) until the 20th century. When we review what Al-Sayyid Al-Murtada wrote and what Al-Allamah Al-Majlisi pointed out, we find that many scholars viewed Karbala as a matter specific and exclusive to Hussein, a secret that might not be appropriate to delve into.

In the mid-20th century, a phenomenon emerged which is commonly known as “political Islam”, and its proponents found that Hussein's movement provided important material to justify revolutionary and jihadi action. Even Sayyid Musa al-Sadr considered, as some researchers believe, that this period required the Shia to transition from Ja'fari politics (the politics of Taqiyya) to Husayni politics (the politics of confrontation and struggle). Gradually, Imami Shi'ism began to move from the theory of truce (Taqiyya in the era of occultation) to the theory of revolution and jihad, drawing upon Hussein's movement. In fact, one scholar attempted to reinterpret the life of Jesus Christ as that of a revolutionary activist, contrary to the prevailing image of him. This shift led some Shia scholars who oppose political Islam entirely to argue that what is happening is a distortion of the identity of Imami Shi'ism, transforming it from a Shia of Taqiyya and waiting for the Mahdi, to a Shia of revolution, which they see as more in line with Zaydi Shi'ism rather than Imami Shi'ism.

What has occurred over the last eighty years represents a significant intellectual leap in the study of this subject, especially concerning Karbala and Hussein. Your perspective on the philosophy of Hussein and Karbala has come to reflect your contemporary ideological affiliation.

From here, we delve into the discussion of the main viewpoints today.

The First Theory: Supra-Rational Theory: This theory posits that Hussein's movement transcends rational human explanation. It asserts that what Hussein did was unique to him and lies beyond the boundaries of the rules we know in jurisprudence. It is difficult for us to understand why he acted as he did or the philosophy behind his actions in Karbala. Consequently, we should revere his actions and refrain from trying to interpret them, as our minds are too limited to comprehend what happened.

Throughout history many people have believed in this theory and continue to do so today. They refer to the dream Imam Hussein had at his grandfather's grave, in which God willed him to be martyred and his women to be taken captive. They claim that the story has a supra-rational, mystical nature beyond human understanding. Hussein knew he was going to his death, yet he went anyway, which is hard to explain.

According to this view, our only relationship with Hussein and Karbala is a tragic and sorrowful one. We should only mourn for him, grieve continuously, hold mourning gatherings, beat our chests, and annually recount his story and what happened to him. Nothing beyond this is necessary. Those who hold this belief are sensitive to the introduction of any other topic into the mourning rituals of Hussein, even intellectual or cultural topics, which they consider unacceptable. For them, the issue of Hussein is solely about Hussein, and nothing else should be included alongside it. The traditions command us to weep and wail, but they do not command us to turn the mourning of Hussein into lectures, intellectual discussions, or political speeches.

The Second Theory: Rational/Pragmatic theory: This theory fundamentally differs from the first and seeks to explain what happened in a rational, historical manner. It suggests that Hussein did not intend to establish a state, lead a revolution, or confront the ruling authority. Rather, he was largely a peaceful man like his brother Hasan. What happened was that after Muawiya died, Yazid sent a message to the governor of Medina, instructing him to take an oath of allegiance from the people of Medina, including the prominent companions and notable figures there. The governor of Medina did as instructed and summoned everyone to the governor's house to pledge allegiance, including Hussein bin Ali.

At this point, Hussein realized he was at a crossroads: either pledge allegiance or be killed. Given that Yazid's appointment contradicted the agreement between Imam Hasan and Muawiya, Hussein refused to pledge allegiance. However, he did not want war, nor did he want to allow them to kill him. He found that the best place to protect himself and his family was the holy city of Mecca, a sanctuary of peace. Thus, he left Medina quietly. All he wanted was to live in peace while not pledging allegiance to Yazid bin Muawiya.

When the people of Iraq learned that Hussein had left and refused to pledge allegiance, they sent him letters inviting him to come to them, promising him safety and that Kufa would be his home as it was his father's. Hussein considered this but did not head to Iraq until he sent Muslim bin Aqil to verify the situation. What happened was that Hussein received information in Mecca that Yazid bin Muawiya had sent a group to kill him even if he was beside the Kaaba. Thus, Hussein was forced to leave Mecca towards Iraq to protect himself and his family. When he was halfway or nearly there, he learned that Muslim bin Aqil had been killed and that the people of Kufa had betrayed him. With no other option, he continued north, hoping to find a place of refuge. He encountered the army of Al-Hurr bin Yazid Al-Riyahi, who forced him to head north until he reached Karbala. There, Hussein told Umar bin Saad: "Let me go in the vast land of God; all I want is to live in peace, but my religion does not allow me to pledge allegiance to someone like Yazid." They refused this, and thus, Hussein's bravery and refusal to pledge allegiance to the oppressor were manifested, resulting in his martyrdom without pledging the allegiance of the humiliated.

The difference between this theory and the first one is that this theory tries to understand and interpret the events, revealing that what Hussein did was rational and comprehensible, not mystical, symbolic, or secretive. However, it simultaneously offers a limited revolutionary reading. In this context, the revolutionary aspect of Hussein's actions was his refusal to pledge allegiance, even if it led to death. Hussein's struggle was a passive jihad, a refusal to align with the group loyal to the authority. This jihad escalated when circumstances forced him into a military confrontation until death.

Thus, this theory does not advocate for a revolution to establish a state or overthrow a tyrannical ruler. Instead, it supports the readiness to die if one is compelled to support an unjust tyrant. This is the level of revolution and militancy in this theory, which seeks to explain why Hussein offered himself as a martyr. He did so because death was preferable to pledging allegiance to a tyrant who would make life humiliating. The conclusion is that Hussein was a man of peace, but if war was imposed on him, he was ready for it, even to the point of death.

The Third Theory: Political theory: However, the third theory aligns closely with jihadi political Islam. It is the theory of revolution to establish a religious state and implement Sharia. The circumstances of this theory's emergence in modern Shia history were unusual and led to one of the most contentious and noisy divisions in modern Shia history, particularly in Iran. To provide a brief historical context, it is important to note that since the 1950s, revolutionary thinking was growing within the Shia religious community in Iraq and Iran and within the religious seminaries. However, this revolutionary movement did not have a unified ideology; there were several sub-movements within it which ranged from the far right to the far left.

One of these sub-movements was the movement that scrutinized and criticized Shia heritage and Shia theology. In the 1960s and 1970s, a well-known figure emerged from this current, closely associated with Sheikh Hussein-Ali Montazeri, namely Sheikh Na'matullah Salehi Najafabadi.

Najafabadi presented what is considered the first detailed analytical study of Karbala, aiming to interpret it in a politically rational and revolutionary manner. He found that the main problem he faced was that Imam Hussein knew in advance that his journey to Karbala would end in death. The reason for this was the theory of "Imam's Knowledge," which is discussed in Shia theology, where it is believed that the Ahl al-Bayt possess knowledge of the unseen. According to this belief, each member of the Ahl al-Bayt knows their fate and the end of their life in detail. So, the problem was, how can we interpret Hussein's movement as an attempt to build a state in Iraq, knowing that he would inevitably die and that this state would never be established?

The political interpretation contradicts the theological foundations of the Imami sect. Hence, Najafabadi engaged in studying the issues of Imamate from multiple angles, focusing his research on issues of exaggeration (ghuluw) and paying significant attention to the issue of the Imams' knowledge of the unseen. After an extensive study, he completely denied the Imams' knowledge of the unseen except in very limited cases. He believed that Hussein did not set out knowing he would die and that all the evidence supporting this claim could be debated and refuted. By dismantling this theological foundation, Najafabadi began constructing his rational, historical, and political interpretation. He considered that all the available information helps us understand Hussein's movement very naturally.

Hussein set out to confront the existing authority and establish his father's state in Iraq to implement God's law, administer justice, and govern following the path of his grandfather and father. For this reason, he headed to Iraq and nowhere else because his supporters were ready for jihad there. He took women and children with him to transition to Kufa, which was to become the capital of his state. In his speeches, he emphasized that he acted seeking reform in the Ummah of Muhammad, to follow the path of his grandfather and father, and to eliminate injustice. All this confirms that Hussein was a revolutionary and political activist aiming to establish God's rule on earth. However, the circumstances ultimately turned against him after the people of Kufa betrayed him, leaving him with two choices: die with dignity or live in humiliation. He chose death over humiliation.

This political interpretation, welcomed by some supporters of the Islamic political movement, provided a justification for revolutionary activity aimed at building an Islamic state in modern times. It triggeredغ one of the biggest crises in the history of contemporary Shia seminaries and the religious community in Iran and Iraq after the publication of his book "The Eternal Martyr" around 1970. Hussein-Ali Montazeri and Sheikh Ali Meshkini wrote the book's introduction, but Meshkini later retracted it due to pressure. Many religious authorities and prominent scholars issued fatwas against the book and its author. Due to his ideas and his closeness to Sheikh Hussein-Ali Montazeri, Najafabadi was rejected in many seminary circles, eventually moving to Tehran, where he passed away in 2006 at over eighty years old.

Thus, we discover that the analysis of the Karbala incident has transformed into a conflict within the seminary between revolutionary and traditional interpretations on one hand, and into an internal division within the revolutionary camp on the other. Many revolutionaries wish to leverage the issue of Imam Hussein for political action, but they refuse to do so at the expense of well-known Shia beliefs, such as the concept of the Imam's knowledge of the unseen. Therefore, we realize that analyzing Hussein's movement has itself become an issue that is intricately connected to Shia theology, and, from the perspective of some scholars, this analysis can threaten Shii beliefs.

So far, we are faced with three perspectives: (1) the supra-rational which rejects any attempt to rationally interpret Husseins movement and considers it a matter of the Imam's mystical knowledge, (2) the rational theory which interprets the movement as a peaceful one aimed solely at refusing allegiance, and (3) the political theory which fully interprets it as a political movement with the goal of establishing a just religious state.

However, many scholars and researchers, mostly supporters of the revolutionary framework, have tried to present a political revolutionary interpretation of Hussein's cause without denying the idea of the Imam's knowledge of the unseen. Najafabadi's analysis seemed significant and appealing to both political Islam and leftist revolutionary Islam in general. Therefore, unlike Najafabadi, this other group offered an interpretation that reconciled with Shia beliefs, led by figures such as Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Dr. Ali Shariati, and others.

The Fourth Theory: Awakening theory: This group presented a fourth interpretation of Imam Hussein's movement, asserting that his movement was indeed within a revolutionary political context, but at the same time, he knew he would be martyred. How was this possible? They argued that Hussein went to Karbala, aware of his martyrdom, not just to die, but to make his death a significant psychological shock for the Muslim community. This community was suffering from a lack of willpower and fear of oppressive authorities, and they did not dare confront injustice, even though they knew right from wrong. To instill courage in the nation, Hussein offered himself as a martyr on the altar of Karbala, so that people would feel anger, sorrow, and grief, leading them to start revolting against the Umayyads, and later against the Abbasids. This is what happened with the Tawwabin uprising and the numerous revolts that followed in the subsequent centuries by the Alawites, Zaydis, Hasanids, and others.

This group did not provide much historical evidence for this interpretation, as Hussein did not explicitly state that he was acting for this reason. Instead, they attempted to reconcile the prevalent Shia beliefs with rational political understanding, finding this explanation to be the most logical one that can be accepted.

This is a summary of the main prevailing perspectives in a very concise manner. There are other interpretations that we do not have time to discuss here. However, what is important for us is that over the span of about sixty years, there has been a tremendous growth in the study of Hussein's history. These intellectual disputes have forced many scholars to re-examine historical facts and verify the authenticity of specific events or statements attributed to Hussein in Karbala. This has become a necessary endeavor to understand Hussein's cause accurately from a historical perspective.

Moreover, this intellectual battle, which has continued for decades, confirms that each group tries to interpret historical religious phenomena in a way that reinforces its overall ideological worldview. Political Islam aimed to interpret Hussein in a way that removes the mystical and historical layers, turning him into a contemporary issue that mobilizes the nation in its causes. On the other hand, the group opposing political activity during the occultation of the Mahdi sought to analyze all matters related to Hussein in a mystical, transcendental manner, emphasizing the purely mystical and tragic dimension.

I believe that this type of analysis of religious history will continue. In a different social and intellectual context, such as the Western context, one might interpret Hussein's movement as a struggle for human rights, while in another context, there could be a different interpretation. This diversity in interpretation is beneficial and enriches academic research. However, it is essential for each group to be prepared to present interpretations based on evidence and documents that respect the standards of rigorous academic research.

In my humble opinion, when Hussein left Medina, he did not intend any political activity other than rejecting the oath of allegiance and protecting himself from being killed and abused. When he received the letters from the people of Kufa while he was in Mecca, he sent Muslim ibn Aqil to confirm that the situation there was stable. Hussein then headed towards Kufa, considering that he would not lead a war there but would arrive in a land already settled for him. He did not want to just live in Kufa peacefully but aimed to revive a state similar to his father's, despite this potentially igniting a conflict with Yazid or perhaps could have lead to other peaceful resolutions. I am not greatly convinced by the idea that he went to die to arouse the nation to revolt, nor do I believe that his movement was mystical and cannot be historically understood or should not be interpreted historically and politically. Additionally, I do not believe in the theory of the Imam's knowledge of the unseen. Hussein knew that the end of his life would be martyrdom, as mentioned in some narrations, but it was not specified when he would be martyred. This is an important point.

I will limit my discussion to this summary. Incidentally, I have explored Hussein's case in detail in my book "The Jurisprudence of War and Peace in Islamic Sharia" in the second volume, spanning approximately 80 pages. However, in that work, I concluded that justifying revolutionary action based on Hussein's movement is extremely unlikely. This is a jurisprudential discussion that we do not wish to delve into here.