By Haidar Hobbollah

Translated by Muhammad Jaffer and edited by Sayyid Burair Abbas

Unfortunately, a trend that has been becoming increasingly prevalent within the English-speaking Shī’ah community has been the character assassination of controversial scholars. While establishing a healthy environment of critique is important, we ought to abstain from employing ad hominem and personal disparagement. Attempts to disenfranchise those who have unorthodox views from their scholarly credentials poses a significant danger to intellectual evolution in Shī’ism. In this light, we found translating this piece from the writings of Shaykh Ḥaydar Ḥubbullāh particularly expedient. We have added our own translator’s notes where deemed appropriate for further clarification. We hope and pray that the reader will benefit from the Shaykh’s analysis of this deconstructive practice.

Analyzing the Justifications Provided in Suppressing Divergent Views[1]

Q: We have repeatedly heard of the religious seminaries employing various forms of suppression upon those with divergent views: from psychological pressure, to expulsion, to suspending the salaries of critics and dissenters. This type of practice occurs even against some of the marāji’ who adopt views that are unorthodox or unconventional in the ḥawzah. The question is: is there any legitimate basis for this practice of cutting off the pensions of those who present unconventional ideas? Is there any basis for expelling people from their religious positions under the pretext of divergent views? Do these practices of censorship—varying as they do from violent to peaceful—pose any danger to our religious relationships? Are these phenomena novel, or did they exist previously and are just manifesting more prominently now that the seminaries are publicly accessible?

A: We would like to draw the attention of the reader to the following twelve points:

This group of scholars advances the notion that allowing these personalities to go unchecked will cause the spread of perversion in the Islamic society. It is perceived that not saying anything shall imply that the religious seminaries and the marja’iyyah condone these divergent ideas and believe in their legitimacy; hence, these deviant and erroneous ideas will be inadvertently empowered. Therefore, it is imperative to completely uproot their mischief since they ought not to be granted any opportunity to exert their influence. In turn, this is deemed one of the applications of enjoining righteousness and forbidding evil.

Sometimes we find other pretexts employed for this behavior. For instance, when pensions are revoked, we see this being justified in that the approval of the Imām (as) for funding controversial individuals cannot be underwritten. Some of the latter-day jurists have ruled that khums must be allocated only to initiatives that one is confident would receive approval from Imām al-Mahdī (as). Therefore, when a marja’ doubts about whether the Imām would consent in financially supporting such individuals, it becomes necessary to halt their funding and suspend their pensions from the religious seminary.

Let us reflect over history and consider why the Buyid Shī’ah empire was considered the Golden Age of Islamic intellectualism. This only happened after it opened its gates for scholars, literarians, poets, philosophers, theologians, jurists, traditionists, scientists, and mathematicians to debate and express all that they desired. Even the most harshly critical scholars of Islamic history have interpreted this period as the “Age of Humanism” in Muslim history.[4] Meanwhile, the Umayyad and Seljuk Empires are taken as classic archetypes of suppression and intimidation of sects, scholars, jurists, and philosophers (as well as the Abbasid Empire during the period of Qur’ānic createdness[5]). Anyone reading through the pages of history will appreciate to what degree the Islamic sciences regressed in the wake of this complete hostility to facilitating intellectual diversity. Garnering these insights from the past is crucial in guiding our decisions today; we ought to apply this hindsight in understanding the current trajectory within our religious seminaries.

Imām Khāmeneī (may God preserve him) has mentioned that it is inappropriate for us to react with violence and emotional outrage whenever a student or scholar presents a new idea or thesis. Rather, we ought to engage with him through intellectual conferences and civilized discussions, without endeavoring to discredit him.[6] By doing so, we will be able to properly benefit from what he has presented and correct the lapses of thought, whether they be present in our own understanding or in his thesis. In addition, everyone will come to attest that his respective viewpoint has critics who are civilized and intellectual in their critique of others.

However, by pouring our vitriol upon divergent thinkers and behaving impulsively, we will inadvertently transform them into oppressed figures in the public eye—people will sympathize with them, and we will build them into figureheads and icons for our enemies to rally behind![7] Simply engaging with others via civilized and cultured discourse will eliminate these persecutory perceptions; when we attempt to attack in a way that marginalizes, demeans, and disparages, it will sooner or later result in the Muslim world aligning themselves with the persecuted—even if it be only due to sympathy.

Another crucial point we need to understand is the nature of the critiques that are prevalent today; we are in an age where the contentions, doubts, and frustrations are entirely unique. We need to follow the current trends of criticism against religious thought—even those which are issuing from within the religious seminaries themselves.[9] If we properly digest these contexts, we will apprehend a great deal of the challenges facing our youth—some of whom are seminarians themselves. We will be able to navigate these challenges with a more integrated discussion rather than resorting to attacks and attempts to discredit. Understanding the current era is of key importance and helps us appreciate that the wide-spanning critique against religion has stemmed from certain deep-standing conventions and complications within our own societies. We need to address these issues like a physician who understands and analyzes the causes for a pathology, even if he may not necessarily have a prescription. Our dearth of expertise in these domains and the lack of diplomacy in addressing issues of contention often precipitates catastrophic collisions of personalities.

The rationalist philosophers believe that the natural order of the universe is an ontological necessity and that its phenomena are governed by the rules of causality. In this context, if we were to properly digest the context in which the Muslim ummah today finds itself, we would realize that the wide-spanning trend towards criticism has resulted from certain causes. When we understand the general milieu that has been affecting the ummah for more than a century, we will understand that these critical schools of thought within religion are completely expected, and we ought to accept their existence. It is incorrect for us to naively approach these schools of thought as if they had emerged out of nowhere and without any precedent. There is a difference between understanding the causes for the emergence of a particular phenomenon and morally affirming its legitimacy. It is entirely possible for me to judge that a certain intellectual trend is completely unsound; however, this does not mean that I should not labor to understand the reasons for its existence.

We have seen that the religious seminary has split into two camps in dealing with this situation. We have seen a faction that has expended every effort in entering such initiatives with every form of zeal to nurture a generation that are true intellectuals (e.g., the Muṭahharī movement, the Ṣadran movement, etc.). Then there is another group which we reproach: those who just stay seated lamenting about Islām and issuing fatwās without offering any serious intellectual contributions—their discourse is peppered with the old-style polemics of yester-year, embodied by displaying tact more than pure intellectualism.

We must also understand that intellectual movements are not political organizations such that we need to censor divergent views because we are working with their proponents. Just because someone belongs to our religious faction does not give us the right to ostracize him when he voices divergent views about issues that do not bear any connection to his religious capacity.[10]

To be continued...

[1] The original Arabic may be found in Ḥubbullāh’s book “Al-Iḍā’āt fī al-Fikr wa al-Dīn wa al-Ijtimā’” (Illuminations: On Thought, Religion, and Society) volume 2, page 508, question # 356.

It may also be accessed here: https://tinyurl.com/2p9eev5w

[2] This may apply in the case of movements that are not rooted in the religious tradition and are attempting to forcibly impose foreign views onto the religious corpus. The attempts of certain individuals to obfuscate Qur’ānic verses condemning homosexuality is particularly instructive; this type of reasoning should be summarily dismissed. Nonetheless, employing suppressive methodologies even against these folks is not the solution, as the Shaykh will clarify further in the subsequent points.

[3] One may consider for instance the attempts of the Church to suppress religious scientists such as Galileo and Copernicus. Unfortunately, this type of suppression eventually precipitated anti-religious trends in Western thought. For more information, we would invite the reader to read through Muṭahharī’s essay “The Causes Responsible for Materialistic Tendencies in the West,” translated by Mujahid Husayn.

[4] The Buyids were an Iranian-Daylamite dynasty that ruled over Iraq and Iran in the 3^rd and 4^th centuries AH. Although they were initially Zaydī Shī’ahs, they converted to Twelver Shī’ism during the occultation period. They were well-known for their intellectualism and their religious tolerance. For details regarding their humanistic spirit, the reader is encouraged to review the work of the Orientalist scholar Dr. Joel Kraemer entitled, “Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age” (1^st edition, 1986).

[5] This was a famous dispute that occurred during the early Abbasid dynasty regarding whether the Qur’ān was eternal or created. It was intimately tied into another theological discussion regarding the nature of God’s speech. Unfortunately, the debate went to the extreme of excommunication and resulted in the death of several Muslim scholars. Most of the Sunni scholars particularly the Ḥanābilah during 3rd century hijri has insisted on the takfīr of anyone who doesn't believe that Qur'ān is qadīm(eternal).

[6] Sayyid Khāmeneī has alluded to this in his speeches a number of times; Arabic readers may refer to the book “Mashārī’ al-Iṣlāḥ wa al-Tajdīd fī al-Ḥawzah al-‘Ilmiyyah” which has complied these various pronouncements. Here, we will suffice here in quoting one of the statements from a speech he delivered entitled “Bayānāt dar Āghāz-e-Dars-e-Khārij-e-Fiqh” dated 1373 SH:

در حوزه‌ها باید روح تطوّر علمی و فقهی وجود داشته باشد. حالا یک وقت به قدر فتوا مواد آماده نمیشود. خوب؛ نشود. بحث علمی را بکنند. من میبینم گاهی چند نفر در یک بحث فقهی، حرف جدیدی را مطرح میکنند. بعد، از اطراف به اینها حمله میشود که «شما چرا این حرف را زدید!؟» در این اواخر، بعضی از فقهای فاضلِ خوبِ دارای فکرِ نو، بعضی از حرفها را مطرح کردند که مطرح کردنش ایرادی ندارد. در حوزه علمیه، باید طاقتِ شنیدنِ حرفهای جدید، زیاد باشد؛ ولو به حدی نرسد که این فقیه فتوا بدهد. ممکن است دیگری، چیزی بر آن بیفزاید؛ فتوا بدهد

“In the ḥawzah, it is imperative for there to be a spirit of intellectual and jurisprudential development. At times enough source material is not available to issue a religious edict; let that be the case then, we ought to still intellectually present our thoughts. We sometimes see that people in a fiqhī discussion will suggest a new idea and then afterwards they are attacked from the sidelines: “Why did you say such-and-such?!” Just recently, some excellent and adept jurisconsults have presented novel ideas that have absolutely nothing objectionable about them. In the religious seminary, we need to cultivate this ability to listen to these new theses; even if they may not be strong enough for jurist x to issue a fatwā, it is possible that jurist y will be able to append his own observations and develop it further enough to eventually issue a fatwā.”

[7] In the modern-day, we can cite the example of the Shirāzīs, who have been scapegoated as the icons of “British Shī’ism” by some recent commentators. By relegating this group to this role, we are inadvertently creating enemies for our own selves and helping to sow further division.

[8] In Arabic, Ḥubbullāh uses some idioms that would lose their significance if translated word-for-word; therefore, we are aiming to convey the general gist.

[9] Among such examples include the likes of Ṣāleḥī Najafābādī, Muḥsin Kadivar, Abdolkarīm Soroush, and Hossein Modarressi.

[10] For example, consider how some take any political critique of Iran as a sign that a scholar is “illegitimate” or “untrustworthy.” It is as though one’s political affiliation must be verified before affirming his religious legitimacy! Another example is the late Ayatullah Ṣāne'ei, whose marja'iyyah was declared invalid by Jāmi'ah al-Mustafa due to his political support for reformists.